streamlined Soviet nuclear command-and-control systems, eased the burden of responsibility on aging and frightened Soviet leadership, and most importantly, would provide nuclear retaliation in a situation of strategic decapitation, answering Soviet leader's fear of uncertainty with the promise of certain retaliation. The following six primary reasons show that the implementation of the Perimeter system was a logical decision on the part of Soviet leadership, and its continued operation was rational. This paper will begin with a basic primer on nuclear warfare and the Cold War into which Perimeter was born. The thermo-nuclear weapons of the 1980's dwarfed the weapon that had destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. In terms of explosive yield, a single megaton bomb is equivalent to seventy Hiroshima explosions. Both the Soviet Union and the United States of America maintained thousands of such weapons, mounted onto thousands of missiles able to cross the world in under half-an hour. 4 In order to deter the other side from ever firing their missiles, each side had to ensure its own ability to respond by maintaining the capacity to totally annihilate the aggressor. This doctrine, adopted by both the Soviets and Americans, is called mutually assured destruction (MAD). 5 Therefore, both sides had to be able to launch their missiles at their enemy once they received positive confirmation of an incoming attack. This requires an organized, coherent command structure with built in redundancy.
Before the Perimeter system is covered in detail, the historical background it was born into must also be explored. The idea for an automatic or semi-automatic strategic nuclear command system was not a new one in 1984, when Perimeter was first tested. 6 The Soviet desire for a system with similar qualities dates back to the Khrushchev era. In 1959, Khrushchev remarked "our rockets will fire automatically," which was certainly false at the time, but highlights the leadership's desire for automatic retaliation. This statement shows that there was an early focus to obtain a quick firing missile. 7 At the time, the first Soviet inter-continental ballistic Missile had yet to reach operational status, the SS-6 Sapwood. The nuclear command and control system relied on paper dockets distributed to each area command, to be opened in a crisis. However, even from this early stage the foresight of Soviet leadership was exemplified.
8 Soviet leaders knew they had to make their deterrence a credible threat, and to do that they required a nuclear command and control system which could react quickly and efficiently to any threat. featured a number of pre-planned attack scenarios, one of which would be chosen based on the perceived nature of the attack. For its part, the research and development of Perimeter began in 1974, the same year ABM limitations were decided on. 12 Evan as Signal-M was being modernized, another nuclear command system was under development which represented a desire for strategic redundancy in line with the Soviet necessity to keep their deterrence valid.
Before Perimeter the Soviet nuclear policy was to "launch on warning", meaning that if early-warning radars, satellites, and sensors detected an incoming missile attack, Soviet missiles would be then launched in retaliation, before the enemy warheads struck Soviet command and control or wiped out the missile fields. The United States had principally the same policy, and both sides were on a "hair-trigger." Launch-on-warning would ensure retaliation, as the missiles could not be stopped once launched. The Soviet Union and the US were operating on a "use them or lose them," mentality, either launch the missiles or potentially lose everything. 13 The fallacy is that even if only one side struck the other with a nuclear attack, they would have committed suicide, the initial strike causing a nuclear winter. 14 This approach came with the serious threat of an accidental nuclear holocaust, as both side's detection systems were prone to displaying false positives. The US system reported over 100 errors in an eighteen-month period. The Soviet system, centered around a constellation of Oka "eye" satellites and the M-10 supercomputer also had a number of false alarms, which could have escalated to nuclear war had it not been for the caution used by the command crews on station.
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Perimeter was designed to be above such errors. It required three different points to be certain before it allowed for retaliation; a loss of contact with political and military leadership, seismic, radioactivity, light, and over-pressure data suggesting a nuclear attack on Soviet soil, and that the Perimeter system be given advance permission to fire. Only at that point would the human command team determine whether to fire the command missiles. 16 The Perimeter system was to provide a number of major benefits over the Signal system, including its level of streamlining and automation, its removal of responsibility from top officials, its departure from the launch-on-warning policy, increased flexibility, and a future-proofing capacity.
The streamlining of Soviet nuclear strategic command was a critical aspect of Perimeter.
Before its implementation Soviet command authority had been reliant on the Signal system, which had its first iteration implemented in 1958. 17 Perimeter would avoid potential problems of confusion and loyalty, rather than having individual missile batteries deliver the order to launch, the command rockets would simply order the missiles out of their own silos. Perimeter's ability to streamline the nuclear strategic command-and-control system also helped to remove Soviet top civilian and military leadership from the loop in case of crisis. In turn helping safeguard against the problems of a geriatric leadership and their fear of responsibility. This was an important factor for Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the USSR, who deeply feared ever having to decide the fate of the world, and was terrified of the responsibility inherent in declaring a retaliatory strike. 22 Additionally, later Soviet leadership were on death's door, and their ability to make sound decisions was permanently in question. Konstantin
Chernenko, for example, spent most of his time as a leader bedridden in a hospital, unable to walk, climb stairs, and was close to death. 23 When these leaders expired there was always some gap between their death and their successor's ascension. This meant there was continuous uncertainty based on the mortality of Soviet leadership, as no one knew exactly when the leader would die. The death of a leader always represented a temporary weak moment in the Soviet strategic command network. Therefore, Perimeter served to alleviate this problem, by being on permanent alert and able to retaliate outside of the conventional command structure.
Perimeter's ability to respond to an attack when the conventional structure had been obliterated allowed it to defeat the possibility of sudden strategic decapitation. Soviet leadership of the early 1980s feared the speed of American "tactical" nuclear missiles. Especially the Pershing II, which could be launched from within Western Europe, fly at supersonic speeds beneath Soviet early warning radar, and destroy Moscow six minutes later. 24 Even in such a nightmare scenario Perimeter could assure mutual destruction.
Uncertainty was a driving factor in Perimeter's deployment and it put the fears of leaders to rest in its unyielding ability to respond even after the Soviet Union had been attacked. One uncertainty was the American nuclear command structure. Not all American missiles were under the president's direct control. This included the American nuclear submarines that could launch authorization and at their own captain's discretion. More uncertainty came in the form of Chinese leadership, which after the Sino-Soviet split had poor relations with the Soviet Union.
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Their first ICBM was deployed in 1981, the same year their first nuclear ballistic missile submarine came into service. 26 The People's Republic of China never officially laid out its nuclear weapon's policy, which was interpreted by Soviet leadership to mean that a sudden strike could come at any time and without warning. 27 In summation, Soviet leaders feared an accidental enemy launch, a rogue enemy launch, and potential third party attack (from the PRC). These strategic uncertainties demanded attention, and the Perimeter system addressed them.
Perimeter not only addressed the uncertainties already present in the minds of Soviet leaders, but it also addressed future concerns. The Chinese were expanding their nuclear capability, adding more warheads and expanding their means of delivery. 28 High-speed, high accuracy nuclear capable cruise missiles were being developed by the United States, which without Perimeter could cause strategic decapitation. High-yield MIRV capable warheads and debilitating EMP (electromagnetic pulse) strikes before the main salvo were also being developed. 29 The nature of perimeter's automation and timing could counter each of these threats, Both sides attempted to depict the other as monsters, which legitimized their own massive stockpiles of weapons and their policies of deterrence and retaliation. 32 Serving as nuclear insurance, Perimeter not only added an element of stability to Soviet planning, but also made it easier for Soviet leadership to trust in their ability to respond, providing them with a degree of confidence that they never had before. The Perimeter system was the logical outgrowth of Soviet nuclear strategic planning, streamlining Soviet nuclear command and control (CiC) systems. It eased the burden of responsibility on the old, and terrified Soviet leadership, and critically provided nuclear retaliation in a situation of strategic decapitation. Today, we live in a very different world than the one which precipitated the creation of systems such as Perimeter, and yet the system remains, as not just a bygone relic of the Cold War, but as an operational element of Russian strategic nuclear command. 33 The Russian Federation and United States both maintain at least a third of their missiles on alert. According to De-Alerting Strategic forces, by Bruce G. Blair, "Thousands of warheads atop hundreds of ballistic missiles," are still poised to annihilate their enemy. 34 Launch on warning remains a primary strategy of both sides. The equipment designed and deployed in the 1980's remains largely in service, and is now more prone to making false alarms as the equipment ages. This leads to a chance of a "launch on falsewarning," situation. 35 Perimeter is now over thirty years old.
The Peoples Republic of China now has both a credible deterrent and are intentionally ambiguous as to how they intend to use them. Threats arising from terrorism and cyber-warfare were not considered when Perimeter was designed. 36 Perimeter was the logical choice for Soviet leadership in 1985, but what use does such a system have today? The existence, and operation of
Perimeter is now public knowledge and continues to serve as a deterrent element of Russian nuclear strategy. The image of three duty officers waiting in their shariki and determining the fate of the world does not belong to a peaceful Earth, and today three officers are awaiting the end of humanity.
